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Abstract
Recently, thanks to new techniques of economic modeling, a renewed literature emerged
in the treatment of spatial aspects of economic activity in an area known as new economic
geography. We contribute to the field by developing a core-periphery model that assumes
CES preferences, rather than a Cobb-Douglas utility function as in the original model
of Krugman (1991). The main purpose of this work is to articulate the widely-studied
agglomeration and dispersion equilibria with the study of changes in the elasticity of sub-
stitution between agricultural and industrial goods, which is made possible by the gener-
alization of the utility function. Through numerical simulations, mainly conducted in a
core-periphery state, complemented by a section dedicated to the economic interpretation,
we develop an analysis that was not previously possible. In general terms, an increase of
the elasticity of substitution promotes agglomeration (and a decrease, dispersion) because
qualifying the two types of goods as substitutes (or complements) changes the share of
expenditure on industrial goods (i.e., the demand) differently in the two regions, which,
ultimately, also modifies the magnitude of the effects discussed in the literature: market-
size, cost-of-living and market-crowding effects. However, these considerations are based
on a price index of industrial varieties significantly lower than the price of agricultural
goods, which, if tested inversely, leads to different conclusions.
Keywords: new economic geography; core-periphery model; agglomeration; dispersion;
constant elasticity of substitution
JEL Classification Numbers: R10 R12 R23
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Resumo
Recentemente, graças a novas técnicas de modelação económica, uma literatura renovada
emergiu no tratamento de aspetos espaciais da atividade económica numa área conhecida
como nova economia geográfica. Com o intuito de enriquecer o campo, foi desenvolvido
um modelo centro-periferia que assume preferências CES, em vez de uma função de util-
idade Cobb-Douglas como no modelo original de Krugman (1991). O principal objetivo
deste trabalho é articular os equilíbrios de aglomeração e dispersão com o estudo de al-
terações na elasticidade de substituição entre bens agrícolas e industriais, que surge pela
generalização da função de utilidade. Através de simulações numéricas, realizadas so-
bretudo numa economia de centro-periferia, complementada com uma seção dedicada
a interpretação económica, desenvolvemos uma análise que não era possível ser provi-
denciada anteriormente. Em termos gerais, um aumento da elasticidade de substituição
promove a aglomeração (e uma diminuição, a dispersão), porque ao qualificar os dois
tipos de bens como substitutos (ou complementares) alteramos a percentagem de despesa
em bens industriais (isto é, a procura) diferentemente nas duas regiões, o que, em última
análise, modifica também a magnitude dos efeitos discutidos na literatura: market-size,
cost-of-living e market-crowding effects. No entanto, estas considerações têm por base
um índice de preços do setor industrial significativamente mais baixo que o preço de bens
agrícolas, que, se testados de forma inversa, originam conclusões diferentes.
Palavras-chave: nova economia geográfica; modelo centro-periferia; aglomeração; dis-
persão; constant elasticity of substitution
Códigos JEL: R10 R12 R23
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1 Introduction
This dissertation falls within the recent strand of neoclassical models developed in the
field of new economic geography. Nevertheless, concepts such as distance or space have
remained, surprisingly, on the outskirts of Economics until very recently, and it was only
following Krugman (1991) that mainstream economists placed geography at the center of
economic activity analysis. These theoretical advances, in regard to the well-established
ideas developed in traditional location theory, were made possible due to a number of
modeling tricks and numerical and computational methods, which enabled the new liter-
ature to embrace models of general equilibrium, “and in which spatial structures emerge
from invisible-hand processes” (Krugman, 1998, p. 9).
Economic Geography is the field that is responsible for the study of the spatial orga-
nization of economic activities and the intrinsic reasons behind it. Despite the emergence
of so-called core-periphery models in the last two decades, it is important to remember
the roots of location theory, the authors and the grounds that justify their position as an
economic model.
1.1 The roots of economic geography
Johann Heinrich von Thünen is, according to Walter Isard (1956, p. 27), the father of loca-
tion theorists, which is the same as saying that economic geography is rooted in The Iso-
lated State (1826). In a scenario of a single isolated town (market), with homogeneously
fertile land and able to generate several cultures, von Thünen showed that competition
among farmers leads to an increase in land costs from the outside limit of cultivation,
where rent is nil, to the center. As shipping costs differ between cultures, agricultural
goods subject to a higher cost of transportation will be closer to the city. The result is a
pattern of concentric rings of production and a study that marked the first ever location
theory.
However, the work of von Thünen, conducted at the beginning of the Industrial Rev-
olution in Germany, was focused on agricultural land use, getting barely within concepts
such as industry or agglomeration. Thus, it was only in the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and the first part of the twentieth century, that a number of economists studied more
thoroughly aspects related to the location of industry.
In the late nineteenth century in England, Alfred Marshall in chapter 10 of the fourth
book of Principles of Economics (1890) analyzed the reasons for the concentration of
specialized industries in distinct locations. According to Marshall (1890, p 225.) “(...) if
one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their
own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas”. Marshallian externalities, as
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they became known, attempt to explain agglomeration as the result of a snowball effect
in which an increasing number of agents wants to organize themselves to benefit from a
wider range of activities and a higher degree of specialization. Regardless of a remark-
able job, Marshall lacks economic modeling and does not provide the microeconomic
mechanisms behind these externalities, but no one had managed to do that thence far.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the German Max Weber was the first in
a series of scholars in the field that became known as German geometry. Weber (1909),
according to Fujita (2010), examined the localization of production according to a triangle
formed by the market and two points of supply inputs. The location of the firm, whose
production requires a given amount of both inputs, will be the one that minimizes the
transportation cost per unit of output. Despite having contributed to the development of
a new general location theory, his review was completely devoid of price analysis and
market structure.
Meanwhile, some models were constructed relating location to firms’ pricing policy.
The emphasis goes to the different conclusions between the works of Hotelling (1929)
and Palander (1935), according to Fujita (2010). Based on the same location model of
Hotelling, where two companies sell the same product in a linear market, both competi-
tors choose their locations and then their prices, considering that consumers bear the trans-
portation cost, moving to the store which carries lower costs. While Hotelling concluded
that both companies tend to agglomerate in the center of the market, Palander, years later,
in a game with two stages, argued that competitors diverge from the center to prevent a
severe price competition. Somehow, Palander’s criticism has shown that a new location
theory was needed to explain more adequately the phenomenon of agglomeration.
And so it happened in 1940, when August Lösch, heir of the German geography
school, published his celebrated work The Economics of Location, where he developed
the broadest general location theory to date. Its main contributions consisted in the defi-
nition of market areas as hexagonal, the consequent analysis of market networks and the
maximization of profit, instead of shipping cost minimization, as the determinant of loca-
tion choice. The patterns of distribution of market areas in space, with the significant help
of Christaller’s (1933) central place theory, managed to explain the existence of industrial
clusters or the formation of cities. However, as mentioned in Fujita et al. (2001), the work
of these authors (particularly central place theory) does not constitute an economic model
since it fails to explain the phenomenon of agglomeration by the interaction of individuals
or firms’ decisions. Ultimately, “It is at best a description, rather than an explanation, of
the economy’s spatial structure” (Fujita et al., 2001, p.27).
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1.2 The new economic geography
In 1991, Paul Krugman wrote Increasing returns and economic geography. Developing
an abstract model seeking to explain the agglomeration of economic activity, the author
managed to draw the attention of mainstream economists to the treatment of spatial as-
pects of economics. His work in the early 90s demonstrated that agglomeration can be
achieved without exogenous regional asymmetries or external economies, or even without
being related to climate or to resource endowments (the so-called first-nature geography,
where the traditional neoclassical literature focused on). According to Krugman (1998,
p.7), “This [new] approach inevitably has much in common with older approaches. Nev-
ertheless, it also has a number of distinctive features that do qualify as a new departure”.
The structure of the reminder of this section is taken from Krugman (1998).
(i) Modelling Principles
There is no doubt that some of the ideas of Von Thünen, Christaller and Lösch are in-
corporated in new economic geography. Incidentally, in this sense, Krugman adds very
little with respect to concepts and theories: the traditional literature is simply updated,
and “the so-called new theories do not add any new variables, nor do they establish differ-
ent relations or reach original interpretations” (Ruiz, 2001). Krugman’s real asset is the
flaw of the others. As mentioned above, some of the most influential works neither take
into account the decisions of individuals and firms, the “microagents”, nor explained the
process of emergence of spatial structures. In new economic geography, however, indi-
viduals choose location maximizing their welfare given what other individuals are doing
(Krugman, 1998). The result is the emergence of spatial structures arising from invisible-
hand processes, a self-organizing system in which the “micromotives” of the agents are
the key (Ruiz, 2001).
(ii) Modelling Tricks
Paul Krugman in a conversation with Masahita Fujita, in The new economic geography:
Past, present and the future (2003), describes the model with a peculiar slogan: "Dixit-
Stiglitz, icebergs, evolution and the computer" (p. 142). Dixit-Stiglitz is relative to the
monopolistic competition model by Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977), adopted
nowadays by various fields of study. According to Krugman, “it has the virtue of pro-
ducing in the end a picture of an economy, in which there are increasing returns [and
existence of monopoly power], (...) not get into the fascinating but messy issues posed by
realistic oligopoly.” (Fujita & Krugman, 2003, p.143). The expression icebergs concerns
a transportation model by Paul Samuelson (1952), in which the costs are introduced by
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imagining that a fraction of the product melts in the road. This avoids the analysis of the
transportation service as an isolated industry, while it simplifies the perception of com-
panies’ costs when setting their monopoly price. On the behalf of agents’ behavior, the
evolution slogan refers to the decision not to assess location by future expectations, but
solely on current conditions. Finally, computer is no more than the use of new numerical
and computational methods, as models of new economic geography “turn out to be a bit
beyond the reach of paper-and pencil analysis” (Krugman, 1998, p.11).
(iii) Modelling Strategy
Above all, Krugman’s framework represents a tension between forces that promote and
forces that oppose agglomeration, i.e, between centripetal and centrifugal forces, respec-
tively.
In the introduction of Increasing returns and economic geography, Krugman first
stresses that, due to economies of scale, the production of each industrial good will be
limited to a small number of locations. Ceteris paribus, the location of these production
plants will be next to markets with high demand, in order to minimize transportation costs.
Then he asks where that demand will be higher. Since part of consumption of manufac-
tured goods is directed for industrial workers, the demand will be bigger the larger the
sector. This is a clear example of the theory of circular cumulative causation of Myrdal
(1957): industrial production tends to concentrate where there is greater demand, but the
market will be bigger as more concentrated the industry is (market-size effect).
The circularity created by backward linkages is reinforced, in turn, by forward link-
ages: other things equal, it is more pleasant to live in the center, where the goods are
not subject to shipping costs (Krugman, 1991). It is known as the cost-of-living effect,
and is more beneficial (for the locals) the more crowded the region. This brings us to the
last property, the only one that acts against agglomeration, the market-crowding effect.
The market-crowding effect is the benefit of the region with a smaller industry, which, by
having a smaller number of firms and workers, faces for the local market less competition
than if it was located in the other region. Obviously, the effect is felt more when workers
are concentrated in one region, because by moving they are able to get a clear comparative
advantage over goods imported from the other region. The outcome of these three forces,
which determines the location of industry, depends on a number of parameters that arise
from the modeling of the main actors in the economic geography.
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1.3 The core-periphery model
The core-periphery model is based on two regions separated in space, each with two
sectors, agriculture and industry. The agriculture sector produces a homogeneous good
in perfect competition (numéraire), whereas the industry sector is characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition where each firm produces a different variety of the same good.
Consumers, although products are symmetric in the sense that they do not prefer one to
another (horizontally differentiated goods), have preference for variety (inversely related
to the elasticity of substitution between different industrial varieties, σ > 1).
There are two types of labor: workers and farmers. Workers are the factor of pro-
duction of industrial goods and travel to the region that offers them a higher real wage.
Farmers sell the agricultural good and in turn are immobile, their distribution being fixed
evenly between regions. Agricultural goods are perfectly tradable across regions, while
the industrial varieties are subject to transportation costs. Krugman (1991), as already
mentioned, conveniently introduces iceberg costs, assuming that only an exogenous frac-
tion of the goods reaches its destination (0 < τ ≤ 1).
In terms of behavioral assumptions, consumers maximize their utility function given
a budget constraint. In Krugman (1991), the consumers’ utility is represented by a Cobb-
Douglas function of an agglomerate of manufactures, CM , and agricultural goods, CA:
U = CµMC
1−µ
A . This choice of utility function establishes that the percentage of expendi-
ture in industrial goods is constant and given by µ. Finally, market entry is free, i.e., in
equilibrium, firms do not enjoy profits.
In equilibrium, due to industrial workers’ mobility, both regions exhibit the same real
wage or the entire industry will be concentrated in the region with the highest one. In
the latter case, a firm may have the incentive to migrate to the other region, referred as
periphery, by the absence of competition. Yet, to move from the core of the economy
entails some downsides, the net result being a counterbalance of forces emphasized in the
role of transportation costs and economies of scale.
On the one hand, firms (workers) that deviate will have to consume a large percent-
age of industrial products that must be imported from the center, affecting their cost of
living. To offset the transportation costs, firms will have to pay higher nominal wages.
Furthermore, most of the market served remains in the other region, which implies more
transport, but, in the opposite direction, serving the population in the peripheral region
becomes cheaper. Thus, agglomeration arises only if τ is below unity (with no transporta-
tion costs location is irrelevant), but moderate enough so that there are no temptations to
serve the peripheral market locally.
The size of the industrial sector, measured by the percentage of expenditure on in-
dustrial goods, is relevant. The higher the value of µ, the worse the living conditions for
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workers who are considering to move will be, since the share of industrial goods that need
to be imported is also higher, but nevertheless, from the firm’s point of view, the demand
in the peripheral region increases.
Finally, the elasticity of substitution between industrial varieties also plays an impor-
tant role on centrifugal and centripetal forces. At equilibrium, σσ−1 is equal to the ratio
between average and marginal cost, a common measure of economies of scale (Krugman,
1991). A low elasticity of substitution can give rise to significant economies of scale,
making it less attractive to serve the peripheral market locally.
In short, with reduced transport costs (low τ), a dominant industry sector (high µ) and
important economies of scale (lower σ), agglomerations become more robust (Schmut-
zler, 1999).
1.4 Modifications to the original model
While Krugman’s model captures important aspects of the development of spatial pat-
terns, it is based on various assumptions which, if relaxed, lead to additional insights, as
Schmutzler (1999, p.364) indicates.
As Krugman points out in What’s new about new economic geography (1998), be-
yond the desire of firms to serve the periphery, there are other centrifugal forces of ag-
glomeration that are not incorporated in the base model. Barkman et al. (1994) modifies
Krugman’s model by introducing effects of congestion. The study concludes that, in the
presence of a negative externality, a complete concentration rarely occurs because pro-
duction in the core becomes too costly.
Assuming n-regions, the results are complex and show, most of the time, multiple
agglomerations as equilibrium (Schmutzler, 1999). With only one more region, such as
Castro et al. (2012) shows, a model with three regions favors concentration in relation to
the initial setup. A work by Krugman and Livas-Elizondo, in 1996, extended the analysis
of a multiple regions’ model in order to study the spatial distribution as a function of the
degree of openness to trade. In addition, they introduce urban rents and commuting costs,
which represents an additional centrifugal force. This occurs because the agglomeration
of industry causes an increase in the size of the city, resulting in the growth of rents and
commuting costs, which ultimately reduces the likelihood of agglomeration.
An analytically solvable model
Forslid & Ottaviano in An analytically core-periphery model (2003) address a major lim-
itation of Krugman’s core-periphery model. By considering that mobile skilled workers
are a fixed cost in the industrial sector, while immobile unskilled workers are the variable
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input in the industrial sector (as well as the single input in agriculture), the model allows
an analytical treatment that is not possible in Krugman’s setting, while maintaining the
properties of the original work. This model is, as well, the starting point for obtaining the
model explored in this dissertation.
1.5 The CES core-periphery model
The theoretical field known as new economic geography studies issues related to the lo-
cation of industry, in a core-periphery model in which it is frequently assumed that agents
have preferences of Cobb-Douglas type. Given that Cobb-Douglas can be seen as a par-
ticular case of a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function, we investigate if the
aspects described in the literature persist in the more general case of a model using a
CES utility function. We also address the impact of the elasticity of substitution between
agricultural and industrial goods (ρ, a new parameter) on the long-term stability of the
traditional agglomeration and dispersion equilibria.
The methodology of this investigation combines analytical and computational treat-
ment. We generalize the Forslid & Ottaviano (2003) model to obtain the relevant equa-
tions when consumers have CES type preferences, later implemented in a numerical
computing software, MatLab. Here, the work partitioned in ensuring that the behavior
observed for a Cobb-Douglas value appears in the new model when ρ tends to zero, be-
yond the illustration of the model’s behavior for positive and negative values of ρ, which
unfolds new insights.
In a core-periphery economy, regarding the elasticity of substitution between agri-
cultural and industrial goods, we found that, when the elasticity is positive, its increase
promotes agglomeration, when compared to the Cobb-Douglas setup. This is because the
increase of substitution between agricultural and industrial goods raises the demand for
industrial goods more proportionately in the core than at the periphery, while the cost of
living is lower. The ratio of utilities increases in favor of the central region, and therefore,
of agglomeration. On the contrary, when the elasticity is negative, the consumption of
industrial goods decreases more strongly in the central region. An agent in the periph-
eral region increases its relative utility by consuming a greater share of industrial goods
(even with transportation costs), acting against concentration. However, the latter case
only reveals itself a force of dispersion given the marked difference in prices between
agricultural and industrial cheaper goods.
Finally, the results of the model also differ when the price of the agricultural good
is lower than the price of manufactured goods. Negative values of ρ increase the share
of expenditure on industrial goods more in the peripheral region, which given the higher
price of industrial goods in relation to agricultural goods, affect the consumption in this
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region compared to the core. The second case, when the goods in the two sectors are sub-
stitutes, again, depends on the degree of the differences between prices. As it was tested,
if prices are distinct, then the substitution harms agglomeration because the demand for
agricultural goods is higher in the peripheral region.
The present dissertation is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is de-
scribed, containing all the relevant functions based on the model of Forslid & Ottaviano
(2003), which, obviously, is not restricted merely to the amendment of the utility func-
tion. In Section 3, we begin by introducing the concepts of agglomeration and dispersion
equilibria, stating the relevant parameters to our study and characterizing the migration
mechanism of skilled workers stemming from the indirect utility between regions. Still in
the same chapter, we complement our analysis with a numerical example, using distinct
values of transportation costs in order to corroborate the same conclusions of the new eco-
nomic geography literature when we set ρ = 0, which corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas
case. We finish Section 3 with a reflection on our efforts to develop analytical conditions
for both known equilibria. Section 4 is focused on simulation of the model in a number of
different scenarios, which, with the assistance of a series of figures, are intended to show
the effects of changes in preferences, on a first instance, in a general form, and later on,
detailed for each relevant parameter. Section 5, in turn, presents the economic interpreta-
tion, duly substantiated, of the results obtained in Section 4. Here the main inferences of
our work are described, which are reiterated in Section 6, of conclusions.
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2 The model
This core-periphery model is based on two regions, each with two sectors, agriculture and
industry. Based on the framework of Forslid & Ottaviano (2003), there are two factors of
production, skilled (H) and unskilled labour (L), both employed in manufactured produc-
tion. Unskilled workers are perfectly mobile between sectors but spatial immobile and
assumed to be evenly distributed across regions (Li = L/2, i = 1,2), unlike skilled ones
that are geographically mobile and therefore choose to reside in the region that offers a
higher well-being (H = H1+H2).
(i) Demand Side
Preferences are defined over two final goods, agricultural (a homogenous good, A) and
manufactured (a differentiated good, X). Unlike Krugman (1991), the preference ordering
of the representative consumer in region i = 1,2 is captured by a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utility function:
Ui =
µX ρi + (1− µ)Aρi
ρ
, (1)
where Xi is the consumption of the manufactures aggregate, Ai is the consumption of
agricultural products, µ ∈ (0,1) is the strength of preference for manufactured goods rela-
tively to the agricultural good and ρ ∈ (−∞,1) is a measure of the elasticity of substitution
between agricultural and manufactured goods1. The first order condition for the problem
of maximizingUi with respect to xi (the demand of a representative consumer), subject to
Pixi +PAai = y, gives us:
Pixi =
y
1+ ( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
, (2)
where Pi is the local price index of manufactures and y each consumer’s income. Define
µ¯i ∈ (0,1), different between regions, as the share of expenditure in manufactured goods:
µ¯i =
1
1+ ( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
(3)
The calculations leading to (3) are given in Appendix A. It is also important to stress
that, relatively to Krugman (1991) or Forslid & Ottaviano (2003), the percentage of expen-
diture on industrial goods is no longer a parameter. The consumption of the manufactures
1Note that the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function is recovered for ρ→ 0. The elasticity of substi-
tution is represented by 11−ρ .
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aggregate, Xi, is defined by:
Xi =
(ˆ
s∈N
di (s)
σ−1
σ ds
) σ
σ−1
, (4)
where di (s) is the consumption of variety s of good X , N is the mass of varieties (N =
ni + n j) and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of good X .
Demand by residents in location i for a variety produced in location j is:
d ji (s) =
p ji (s)−σ
P1−σi
µ¯iYi, i, j = 1,2, (5)
where p ji is the consumer price of a variety produced in j and sold in i and Y i the local
income consisting of skilled (wi) and unskilled wages (wLi ), defined by:
Y i = wiHi +wLi
L
2
(6)
The local price index of manufactures Pi associated with (4) is:
Pi = *,
ˆ
s∈ni
pii (s)1−σds+
ˆ
s∈n j
p ji (s)1−σds
1
1−σ +- (7)
The representative consumer in region i has the following budget constraint when maxi-
mizing utility (1):
Yi =
ˆ
s∈ni
pii (s)dii (s)ds+
ˆ
s∈n j
p ji (s)d ji (s)ds+ pAi Ai (8)
(ii) Supply Side
Firms in the industrial sector are monopolistically competitive and employ both skilled
and unskilled workers under increasing returns to scale. The total cost of production of a
firm, in location i, is:
TCi (s) = wiα+wLi βxi (s), (9)
meaning that in order to produce x(s) units of variety s, a firm must employ α units of
skilled labour (fixed cost) and a marginal input of βx units of unskilled labour. Trade
of manufactures is subject to a transportation cost, modeled as iceberg costs (1 ≤ τ <
+∞)2. Given the fixed input requirement α, skilled labour market clearing implies that in
equilibrium the number of firms is determined by:
2Differently to Krugman (1991), where 0 < τ ≤ 1
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ni =
Hi
α
(10)
Firms in agriculture produce a homogenous good under perfect competition and employ
only unskilled labour, in a way that one unit of output requires one unit of unskilled
labour. Thus, perfect competition implies pAi = w
L
i , i = 1,2. Good A is freely traded so
that its price is the same everywhere (pA1 = p
A
2 ). Due to marginal cost pricing, this also
implies inter-regional wage equalization (wL1 = w
L
2 ). This suggests choosing good A as
numéraire, so that pA1 = w
L
1 = p
A
2 = w
L
2 = 1.
A typical manufacturing firm located in region i maximizes its profit function:
pii (s) = pii (s)dii (s)+ pi j (s)di j (s)− β
[
dii (s)+ τdi j (s)
]
−αwi, (11)
where τdi j (s) represents total supply to the distant location j inclusive of the fraction of
product that melts away in transit due to the iceberg costs. The first order condition of
maximization of (11), for every i and j, is:
pii (s) =
βσ
σ−1 , pi j (s) =
τ βσ
σ−1 (12)
After using (12), the price index (7) simplifies to:
Pi =
βσ
σ−1
[
ni +φn j
] 1
1−σ , (13)
where φ = τ1−σ ∈ [0,1] is the ratio of total demand by domestic residents for each foreign
variety to their demand for each domestic variety, therefore a measure of freeness of trade.
Replacing (10) in (13), the price indices of regions 1 and 2 are:
P1 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ [
h+φ(1− h)] 11−σ (14)
P2 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ [
1− h+φh] 11−σ (15)
Due to free entry and exit, there are no profits in equilibrium. A firm’s operating profits are
entirely absorbed by the wage bill of its skilled workers: αwi = pii (s)dii (s)+pi j (s)di j (s)−
β
[
dii (s)+ τdi j (s)
]
. Given (12), we obtain:
wi =
βxi
α(σ−1) (16)
where xi = dii (s) + τdi j (s) is total production by a typical firm in location i. Using (5),
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(12), (13) and (16), we can determine the output of firms in both regions:
xi =
σ−1
βσ
(
µ¯iYi
ni +φn j
+
φµ¯ jYj
φni + n j
)
(17)
Using (9) and (13), (17) can be equivalently written as:
wi =
1
σ
(
µ¯iYi
Hi +φH j
+
φµ¯ jYj
φHi +H j
)
(18)
Plugging expression (6) into (18) generates a system of two linear equations in wi and
w j , that can be solved to obtain the equilibrium skilled wages as explicit functions of the
spatial distribution of skilled workers Hi, whose expression is obtained in Appendix B
and displayed as:
wi =
L
2σ
φHi ( µ¯i + µ¯ j )+
[
µ¯i − µ¯i µ¯ jσ + (1+ µ¯iσ ) µ¯ jφ2
]
H j
φ(H2i +H
2
j )− (H2i µ¯i +H2j µ¯ j ) φσ +
[
1+ 1
σ2
− µ¯i+µ¯ jσ + (1−
µ¯i µ¯ j
σ2
)φ2
]
HiH j
, (19)
for i, j = 1,2. The ratio between the equilibrium skilled wages, defining h = H1/H as the
share of skilled workers that reside in region 1, is:
w1
w2
=
φh( µ¯1+ µ¯2)+
[
µ¯1− µ¯1 µ¯2σ + (1+ µ¯1σ ) µ¯2φ2
]
(1− h)
φ(1− h)( µ¯1+ µ¯2)+
[
µ¯2− µ¯1 µ¯2σ + (1+ µ¯2σ ) µ¯1φ2
]
h
(20)
It is important to emphasize that this expression, despite being formally very similar to the
equivalent (17) in Forslid & Ottaviano (2003), underlies a major distinction. The share
of expenditure in manufactured goods µ¯i, i = 1,2, before just a parameter, depends on
the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and manufactured goods ρ and on the
region’s price index.3 The indirect utility, i.e., the maximal utility attainable in region i
for given prices and wages, is:
Vi =
µ
1
ρ
Pi
1+
(
1− µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ
P
ρ
1−ρ
i

1−ρ
ρ
wi, (21)
or, simply, Vi =
µ
1
ρ
µ¯
1−ρ
ρ
i
(
wi
Pi
)
(see Appendix C). Finally, the ratio between the indirect utilities
gives us a starting point to study agglomeration and dispersion patterns:
V1
V2
=
P2
P1
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ w1
w2
(22)
3This will have implications in the analytical treatment of the long-run equilibrium patterns.
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3 Long-run equilibria
Let us start the study of agglomeration and dispersion equilibria, focusing our analysis on
the ratio between indirect utilities (22), an indicator that triggers the mobility of skilled
workers between regions (see also Section 3.1). The utility of any skilled worker in re-
gion i = 1,2 will depend on his wage (wi), on the price index associated (Pi) and on the
share of expenditure in manufactured goods, µ¯i. Contrary to the original model, the latter
depends not only on µ (that now only represents a measure of preference for manufac-
tured goods relatively to the agricultural good), but also on the elasticity of substitution
between agricultural and manufactured goods, ρ, and on the region’s price index. In-
deed, Pi incorporated in µ¯i makes fixed cost, α, marginal cost, β, and number of skilled
workers, H , that on Krugman’s model were eliminated by choice of units, parameters
relevant to our study. Finally, and to complete the description of all the parameters that
affect the model’s behavior, the ratio of indirect utilities also depends on the elasticity of
substitution between industrial varieties, σ, and on transportation costs, τ.
Assuming symmetry regarding the production factors, the immobility of unskilled
workers makes them evenly split between regions. The issue has to do then with industry
and skilled workers: in the long term, the industry can be fragmented between the two
regions, or concentrated in one, creating an economy divided between an industrial center
(or core) and an agricultural periphery. Herein, we need to introduce the concept of long-
term equilibrium (from now on, just equilibrium), as the distributions of skilled workers
that remain unchanged over time. An equilibrium is stable, as Gaspar (2012, p.11) ex-
plains, “if after occurrence of some small exogenous migration of skilled workers to any
of the regions, the spatial distribution of skilled workers is pulled back to the initial one.”
Thereby, a dispersion equilibrium is observed when the skilled workers are equally
divided and is stable if, after a small migration, the economy returns to a symmetry of
industries. By moving, for example, from region i to region j, a skilled worker causes
the real wage of region j to become comparatively lower than the one in region i, and
consequently, a different skilled worker will do the opposite movement. On the other
hand, an agglomeration equilibrium is stable when the real wage of the region in which all
entrepreneurs are located is larger than the real wage in the region without manufacturing.
To determine when we have a stable or unstable equilibrium, let us analyze both situations
from the analytical and numerical point of view.
3.1 Equilibrium patterns
As explained before, workers are short-sighted and choose their location by maximizing
their indirect utility. According to Forslid & Ottaviano (2003, p.234), skilled worker
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migration follows a simple Marshallian adjustment, where the rate of change of skilled
workers in one region only depends on the indirect utility differential (or ratio, in our
model) between the two regions:
h˙ ≡ dh
dt
=

V1
V2
−1 i f 0 < h < 1
min
{
0, V1V2 −1
}
i f h = 1
max
{
0, V1V2 −1
}
i f h = 0
where t is time. The share of skilled workers in region 1, expressed as h, becomes an
essential indicator in the study of the long-run dynamics, as it allows us to work with only
one region, while providing the necessary information to understand the inter-regional
dynamics (1− h is the implied share of workers in the region 2). Furthermore, as skilled
workers are a fixed productive factor in industry, the share of skilled workers in region 1
is equivalent to the share of industry (as a whole) in region 1.
The level of transportation costs is a determinant parameter for the stability of each
available equilibrium and hence, for observed equilibrium patterns. Figure 1 shows the
ratio of indirect utilities, against h, for low transport costs (τ = 1.1) and for high transport
costs (τ = 1.2). The results, using ρ→ 0, remain loyal to Krugman’s (1991) conclusions.
In respect to other parameters, we assume σ = 4, µ = 0.3 (similarly with Krugman),
besides α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100.
Figure 1: Ratio of utilities over h, for ρ→ 0, for τ = 1.1 and τ = 1.2
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100.
Full circles represent stable equilibria and empty circles denote instability.
For τ = 1.2, the ratio of utilities slopes downwards in h. In the long-term, the economy
converges to a stable dispersion equilibrium where the industry is divided equally between
the two regions. At h = 12 , a deviation of any worker is not useful, given that the ratio of
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utilities raises in favor of the region from where they left. For example, if a entrepreneur
moves from region 1 to 2, h reduces and, therefore, V1V2 increases, improving the utility of
the region 1 compared to the other region.
On the contrary, for τ = 1.1, the ratio is positive for h > 12 , negative for h <
1
2 (at h =
1
2
wages are always equal due to the symmetry). When a region contains the majority of
the manufacturing labor force, workers from the other region have the motivation to shift
towards the most industrialized zone. Thus, in the long-term, workers will all move to the
same region: an agglomeration equilibrium in region 1 if h > 12 , and in region 2 if h <
1
2
(unlike the latter, agglomeration equilibria are always stable). This upward slope results
both from market-size effects (see modelling strategy in Section 1.2) and, of course, low
transport costs. Let us recall that without transportation costs location is irrelevant, and
an agglomeration equilibrium only happens in a situation in which transport costs are
moderate enough that serving the peripheral market from the center is not prohibitive, a
situation observed through the first example for τ = 1.2.
Surprisingly, a unique agglomeration or dispersion equilibria are not the only possi-
bilities. For certain intermediate values of transport costs, we may observe both equilibria
for one given set of parameters. Figure 2, for τ = 1.125, reveals this special case that
displays multiple stable equilibria.
Figure 2: Ratio of utilities over h, for ρ→ 0, for τ = 1.125
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100.
Full circles represent stable equilibria and empty circles denote instability.
The graph shows a total of five equilibria, three of which are stable, as shown also
in Fujita, et al. (2001, p.67). The dispersion equilibrium is locally stable at h = 12 , as
in the case of high transport costs, but lies now between two unstable equilibria. That
is, for an initial value of h sufficiently low or high, the economy can also converge to a
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agglomeration state in region 2, at h = 0, or region 1, at h = 1.
These statements are in line with the literature, which gives us the legitimacy to begin
the study of the model when ρ, 0, the main objective of this work and what differentiates
it from all the others. As an introduction, Figure 3 shows V1V2 over h, for ρ = 0.5 and also
for two different values of the transportation cost.
Figure 3: Ratio of utilities over h, for ρ = 0.5, for τ = 1.2 and τ = 1.6
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Full circles represent stable equilibria.
Notice that the figure presents both equilibria, a dispersion equilibrium where work-
ers are distributed equitably (function that decreases with h) and an agglomeration state
in any of the two regions, depending on the initial h. Transportation costs, however, are
not the same, especially as in the Cobb-Douglas limit (ρ→ 0), the value τ = 1.2 produces
a dispersion equilibrium, unlike what is observed here. This reflects the effect of the elas-
ticity of substitution between agricultural and industrial goods on the spatial distribution
of industry. This issue is continued in Section 4.
3.2 The search for analytical solutions
From the beginning, our goal was to prepare both analytical and numerical solutions.
Unfortunately, from the analytical point of view, we faced unpromising results, for not
being able to develop a simple condition neither for the agglomeration equilibrium, nor
for the dispersion one. In the remaining of this section, we illustrate our difficulties.
Starting with agglomeration, the simpler of the two, we obtain a stable equilibrium for
V1
V2
> 1, for h = 1. Recovering expression (22), and taking h = 1 as given, the condition is:
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φ
1
1−σ
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ φ
(
µ¯1+ µ¯2
)
µ¯2− µ¯1 µ¯2σ + (1+ µ¯2σ ) µ¯1φ2
> 1, (23)
with µ¯i = 1
1+( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
(i = 1,2), P1 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ and P2 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ φ
1
1−σ . Unfortu-
nately, our hopes of getting a simpler condition bump on the difficulty in working with µ¯i,
due to the differences between price indices. Instead of replacing the entire expression,
we try to rearrange µ¯1 and µ¯2 into the fraction they share in common and the one that
differentiates them, whose outcome is exposed in the following expression4:
φ
2−σ
1−σ
(
1+ θ
1+φ∗θ
) 1−ρ
ρ 1+ 1+θ1+φ∗θ
1+θ
1+φ∗θ +φ
2− (1−φ2) 1(1+φ∗θ)σ
> 1, (24)
defining the common part as θ =
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ
(
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ
) ρ
1−ρ
and the distinctive fraction as
φ∗ = φ
ρ
(1−σ)(1−ρ) . Even so, the problem remains, by not been able to reduce the expression
to a condition that explains the agglomeration equilibrium in a straightforward way.
Aggravating, is the case of a dispersion of skilled workers, whose analytical condition
for a stable equilibrium is defined by ∂V1∂h < 0, for h =
1
2 . The negative first derivative
ensures that no worker has the incentive to work in the other region, which is easy to
examine in a figure, but difficult to prove analytically. The following expression for V1
makes the point:
V1 =
µ
1
ρ
βσ
σ−1 ( Hα )
1
1−σ [h+φ(1−h)]
1
1−σ
[
1+
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ
(
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ [h+φ(1− h)] 11−σ ) ρ1−ρ ] 1−ρρ
L
2
1
σ
φ( µ¯1+µ¯2)H1+
[
µ¯1− µ¯1 µ¯2σ +(1+
µ¯1
σ ) µ¯2φ
2
]
H2
φ(H21+H
2
2 )−(H21 µ¯1+H22 µ¯2) φσ+
[
1+ 1
σ2
− µ¯1+µ¯2σ +(1−
µ¯1 µ¯2
σ2
)φ2
]
H1H2
Besides the issue of the size of the expression, many of the µ¯i are not replaced, and
we were unable to put the whole function depending on the ratio h = H1H1+H2 . As the reader
will agree, this expression is beyond reasonable analytical treatment.
4The calculations leading to (24) are given in Appendix D.
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4 Simulation
In this section, we present, through numerical computations, the effect of the elasticity of
substitution between agricultural and manufactured goods (from now on, just elasticity of
substitution), on the patterns of equilibria already stated, besides its influence within the
parameters already widely-studied by the new economic geography literature. Recall that
this parameter is introduced by a CES utility function, that unlike a Cobb-Douglas type,
mainstream in the core-periphery models, covers a range between ρ ∈ (−∞,1).
Let us start by picking up the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ = 0) and introduce small per-
turbations in the parameter, in the most usual representation, which opposes the ratio of
indirect utilities V1V2 to the share of industry (or skilled workers) in region 1. Figure 4 uses a
value of τ corresponding to an intermediate case of transportation costs for ρ→ 0 (based
on Figure 2), and just by a very small variation, both positive and negative, will give us a
first impression on all known equilibria.
Figure 4: Ratio of utilities over h, for τ = 1.125, for small perturbations on ρ
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Full circles represent stable equilibria and empty circles denote instability.
The results, displaying only the effects of small variation in both directions from the
Cobb-Douglas case, highlight the shift from an agglomeration equilibrium for ρ = 0.005,
up to a unique dispersion equilibrium for ρ= −0.005, experiencing a situation of multiple
equilibria in ρ→ 0, a special situation already discussed in Section 3. Although with very
small differences on the ratio of indirect utilities, the purpose of the figure is to expose
that we do not need large variations of ρ to see major changes concerning equilibrium
patterns.
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Obviously, we chose a value of transportation costs that would enable us to make this
inference, and, no less true, is the fact that we can repeat the exercise for any parameter
in the model. Similar results are obtained for variations in σ as illustrated next. Keeping
with τ = 1.125 and ρ→ 0, but shifting the focus to a disturbance in the elasticity of
substitution between industrial varieties σ, we encounter a resembling figure.
Figure 5: Ratio of utilities over h, for τ = 1.125, for small perturbations on σ
ρ→ 0, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Full circles represent stable equilibria and empty circles denote instability.
For the initial σ = 4, we continue to face multiple equilibria, but now the variation
of this parameter has the opposite effect with respect to the last figure: an agglomeration
equilibrium for a decrease in σ, and a dispersion state for σ = 4.05.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that this tells us very little in regard to the model’s dynam-
ics, wherein each individual parameter has a different behavior, and where some of them
are not strictly monotonic in their interval. Estimating the impact of the elasticity of sub-
stitution in the evolution of spatial patterns of the economy is also not an easy task, since
it modifies part of the solid framework of the original model, specially the settings of the
share of expenditure in industrial goods. Accordingly, we need to be especially cautious
on separating effects in order to make more forceful conclusions, but bearing in mind that
we have a question that is answered only by cross interaction of multiple parameters.
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4.1 Elasticity of substitution between agricultural and industrial goods
At this point, it becomes essential to study the elasticity of substitution when it assumes
a value other than zero. In this context, we will examine three distinct values of ρ, based
on the already used setup, a = 1, b = 0.1, H = 100, σ = 4, µ = 0.3, and finally, τ = 1.2. 5
Figure 6: Ratio of utilities over h, for ρ→ 0, ρ = −0.5 and ρ = 0.5
τ = 1.2, σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Full circles represent stable equilibria.
In Figure 6, which again opposes the ratio of indirect utilities to the share of industry in
region 1, we give two opposite values of ρ in addition to the Cobb-Douglas solution, that
presents an unique dispersion equilibrium given the downward slope. In ρ = −0.5, we
continue to observe a decreasing trajectory, with an even steeper slope, moving further
away from the possibility of agglomeration. At the other end we have ρ = 0.5, which
leads to an agglomeration equilibrium, inducing h = 0 whenever h < 12 and h = 1 when
h > 12 . From plain observation, we could say that the decrease in the parameter promotes
dispersion, while its increase encourages agglomeration, but is the effect the same (in
terms of direction and intensity) for any variation? The best way to exhibit the effect of ρ
throughout its range, on the stability of agglomeration, is by setting h = 1 and evaluating
V1
V2
.
If we assume that industry is all concentrated in region 1, whenever the ratio of util-
ities is above one (V1V2 > 1), we encounter an agglomeration equilibrium. The major ad-
vantage of setting h = 1, thus, is the ability to visualize, for a wide range of a parameter,
which values support a concentration of industry in a core-periphery economy. Moreover,
5The discussion on other parameters’ implications are organized in the next sections.
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placing multiple functions in the same figure allows us to study the joint effect of two
indicators (one being on the axis, the other resulting in different functions).
When the ratio of utilities is below unity no conclusion can be made on the stability of
dispersion. The condition for a dispersion equilibrium is ∂V1∂h < 0 for h =
1
2 , so, as we set
h= 1, we do not have the certainty of what happens if the share of skilled workers in region
1 is lower. Therefore, the next subsections, by using this type of tests, are more focused in
the study of agglomeration patterns. Nevertheless, most importantly than only observing
if the ratio of utilities is above or below the unity, the effects of changes in the elasticity
of substitution can be structured into the forces directed towards agglomeration and the
forces that originate the dispersion of industry. Figure 7 illustrates the ratio between
indirect utilities over ρ ∈ (−1,1):
Figure 7: Ratio of utilities over ρ, for h = 1
τ = 1.2, σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Based on our setup, starting on ρ = −1, all values up to ρ ≈ 0.2 lie beneath the condi-
tion V1V2 > 1: agglomeration is not an equilibrium. Past this point, throughout the range of
positive values of ρ, a pattern of agglomeration in region 1 emerges. An important note is
that we are facing a monotonic non-decreasing function, which translates into an increase
(or unaltered for high values of ρ) of V1V2 for every increase of the elasticity of substitution.
Therefore, a raise in the elasticity of substitution always works in favor of agglomeration,
whereas a decrease works in favor of dispersion. In terms of slope, this starts to slowly
increase, reaching a maximum between 0 < ρ < 0.6, stabilizing from ρ = 0.7 onwards.
This makes us infer, from the point of view of a Cobb-Douglas benchmark, that the in-
crease of the elasticity of substitution for positive values has a higher proportional effect
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in the ratio of utilities than its decrease to negative values.
Still, it would be important to examine, within the ratio of utilities’ expression, which
variables or parameters are more sensitive to the elasticity of substitution. Recovering
expressions (20) and (22), the ratio between skilled wages and the ratio of utilities, re-
spectively:
w1
w2
=
φh( µ¯1+ µ¯2)+
[
µ¯1− µ¯1 µ¯2σ + (1+ µ¯1σ ) µ¯2φ2
]
(1− h)
φ(1− h)( µ¯1+ µ¯2)+
[
µ¯2− µ¯1 µ¯2σ + (1+ µ¯2σ ) µ¯1φ2
]
h
V1
V2
=
P2
P1
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ w1
w2
The functions, in relation to Forslid & Ottaviano (2003), appear very similar (the
prices indices being exactly the same as before). The only difference is the variable µ¯i,
i = {1,2}, the share of expenditure in industrial goods, that ceases to be a constant and
becomes different between regions. The function is displayed on expression (3):
µ¯i =
1
1+ ( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
Moreover, the results of this model for a Cobb-Douglas utility function are recovered
when ρ tends to zero, which makes µ¯i = µ. Then, if everything else seems equal to the
original framework, understanding the effect of the elasticity of substitution on the ratio
of utilities, and therefore, on equilibrium patterns of spatial distribution of industry, must
lie on µ¯i settings. To this end, Figure 8 shows, in addition to the ratio of utilities, also µ¯1
and µ¯2 over ρ.
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Figure 8: Ratio of utilities over ρ + µ¯1 and µ¯2 over ρ, for h = 1
τ = 1.2, σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
The two figures display, unequivocally, the same trend. It can also expose, given
the restriction on the share of expenditure on industrial goods µ¯i ∈ (0,1), why the ratio of
utilities stagnates from a certain value of the elasticity of substitution. Given the evidence,
we can assume that all effects generated by the change of the utility function summed up
to the analysis of µ¯i according to ρ. However, µ¯1 is not exactly equal to µ¯2. Setting h = 1,
the price index of the core region is lower than the one in the periphery, which makes
µ¯1 greater than µ¯2 for positive values of the elasticity of substitution, with the opposite
occurring when ρ < 0.
More significantly, it explains the origin of the improvement on the ratio of utilities
in favor of region 1, for positive values of ρ, which works as an agglomeration force. As
µ¯1 > µ¯2, workers from the core region benefit from a higher consumption of industrial
goods, compared to the periphery, where, in addition to a lower consumption of industrial
goods, the same are subject to shipping costs. When ρ < 0 and the share of expenditure
drops strongly in region 1, the peripheral population increases their utility in relation to
the center by consuming a greater percentage of industrial goods, even in the presence
of the same transportation costs. Indeed, transportation costs clarify why the ratio of
utilities increases more proportionately for ρ > 0, than its decrease for ρ > 0. In h = 1,
industrial goods will always be cheaper in region 1, which intensifies the differences when
the percentage of expenditure is higher in this region, and mitigates them when µ¯1 < µ¯2.
On a final note, µ¯i is in line with the role of µ in basic core-periphery models, which
associate agglomeration states to dominant industry sectors. However, the elasticity of
substitution, which makes agricultural and industrial goods complements or substitutes,
causes the analysis to be different from the rest of the literature. Accordingly, the figure
will be resumed, in Section 5, to an economic interpretation analysis.
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4.2 The transportation costs
Much of the discussion on transport costs has been clarified in Section 3. In order to
promote agglomeration, the transportation costs have to be moderate, while high trans-
port costs lead to a dispersion equilibrium. A CES utility function will not change this
conclusion, but it contains some interesting points, that we will again show by setting a
core-periphery economy (h = 1), in order to vary another parameter in one of the figure
axes, in this case, τ.
Figure 9: Ratio of utilities over τ, for h = 1, for different ρ
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
The graph shows the evolution of the ratio of indirect utilities to a range of transporta-
tion costs, τ ∈ (1,1.5), and also for different values of ρ. Starting from the Cobb-Douglas
case, an increase in the elasticity of substitution, besides rising the V1V2 for any level of
cost, extends the range of values of τ supporting an agglomeration equilibrium, given the
condition V1V2 > 1 (h = 1). To some extent, the way we define transportation costs might
change, if we think of low costs as a promoting factor of an agglomeration economy and
high transport costs as a feature of a dispersion equilibrium. For example, when ρ = 0.5,
τ = 1.2 is a relatively low transportation cost, as it allows the industry to concentrate on
only one region, but, when ρ→ 0, the ratio of utilities is below one, which means that,
using the same reasoning, τ = 1.2 should be regarded as a high transportation cost. The
next figure, in addition to providing the same conclusion, offers another characteristic of
the interaction of transport costs with the elasticity of substitution that is being studied.
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Figure 10: Ratio of utilities over ρ, for h = 1, for different τ
σ = 4, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Here, the horizontal axis represents ρ and V1V2 is flotted for different values of τ, the
reverse of the latter figure. While at ρ = 0.5 (and throughout most of the positive range
of ρ), all drawn functions of τ are above V1V2 = 1 (h = 1), for ρ→ 0 (Cobb-Douglas), only
the lowest, τ = 1.1, is a transportation cost compatible with agglomeration. Also, the
effect of ρ on the ratio of utilities for relatively low values of transportation costs is rather
curious. For instance, V1V2 for τ = 1.2, at Cobb-Douglas, is below one and is the lowest in
relation to all low transport costs cases represented. Yet, throughout ρ, the ratio of utilities
eventually overcomes, first, τ = 1.1 (which had already been surpassed by τ = 1.15), and
then the latter. This displays that for a high elasticity of substitution, the transportation
cost that maximizes the ratio of utilities is a value of τ that might be considered a high
transportation cost in the original model, which reinforces what we stated previously.
Finally, one can also say that the increase of ρ has the effect to smooth out the gap
between ratios of utilities, when exhibiting significantly different values of transportation
costs. For instance, between τ = 1.1 and τ = 1.5, at Cobb Douglas, the differences be-
tween ratios (that even escapes the figure’s limits on the case of τ = 1.5, but which is set
on V1V2 ≈ 0.66), are wider. As ρ grows, the function with higher transportation costs grows
at a faster rate than τ = 1.1 (and all the others function represented), at least up to the stag-
nation that all functions show for high values of the elasticity of substitution. In summary,
what positive values of ρ adds in terms of transportation costs, besides raising the range
of τ that tend to an agglomeration equilibrium, it also removes some sensitivity to large
variations in costs: for an increasing ρ, the gap between two ratios of utilities, which have
distinct transportation costs, reduces, compared to the situation at Cobb-Douglas, where
the difference is larger.
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4.3 Preference for variety
In the introduction of the current section, we have already presented graphically, but
briefly, the effect of the elasticity of substitution between industrial varieties (σ). Namely,
it was shown, in a multiple equilibria state, that an increase of σ, from 4 to 4.05, dimin-
ishes the ratio of utilities for h > 12 (leading to a dispersing equilibrium), and a decrease to
σ = 3.95 leads, again when region 1 holds more than half of skilled workers, to a growth
of the ratio V1V2 , favoring an agglomeration output. Nevertheless, a decrease in σ does not
always lead to an increased ratio in favor of region 1. Figure 11 shows, again for h = 1
and τ = 1.2, the ratio of utilities against the elasticity of substitution between industrial
varieties, σ > 1. In order to also study the joint effect with the elasticity of substitution
between agricultural and industrial goods, we considered several values of ρ.
Figure 11: Ratio of utilities over σ, for h = 1, for different ρ
τ = 1.2, µ = 0.3, α = 1, β = 0.1 and H = 100
Observing the figure, we can assess that, for any of the represented ρ values, the value
of the ratio increases slightly for low values of σ, followed by a long decline phase for
medium and high σ. Recovering Krugman (1991, p.490), σσ−1 is the ratio of the marginal
product of labor to its average product, that is, the degree of economies of scale. Then
it makes sense, given that economies of scale are associated with low values of σ, that
in a situation where all the entrepreneurs are concentrated, the ratio of utilities in favor
of this region is bigger for low values of the elasticity of substitution between industrial
varieties.
A rise of the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and industrial goods, as al-
ready discussed, increases the ratio of utilities, and here we come to the same conclusion.
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Only be noted that, excluding Cobb-Douglas, the functions depart from the same point of
origin, overlap for sufficiently low values of σ, and then diverge according to the value of
ρ.
In terms of equilibria, all the functions represented present the agglomeration equilib-
rium for low values of σ. Yet, for example, on Krugman’s benchmark, σ = 4, a Cobb-
Douglas utility function has a ratio of utilities lower than unity. The other represented
values, all positive values of the elasticity of substitution between agricultural and indus-
trial goods, by opposite, are above V1V2 = 1 at h = 1.
4.4 The price index
The impact of σ is not limited to the description of the latter subsection. Here are the
price indices of both regions, expressions (14) and (15), identical to a model that assumes
Cobb-Douglas preferences:
P1 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ [
h+φ(1− h)] 11−σ
P2 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ [
1− h+φh] 11−σ
At Krugman (1991) or Forslid & Ottaviano (2003), the price index is represented in
the ratio of indirect utilities by P2P1 , which ultimately nullifies the first part of the function.
In our model, we continue to behold P2P1 , but now each price index generates effects on the
share of expenditure on industrial goods in the respective region µ¯i, i = 1,2. So, what’s
the relevance of βσσ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ ?
First of all, recall that α is the fixed cost of producing a variety of manufactures and β
is the marginal cost of producing each unit, while H is the total number of skilled workers
in the economy. Skilled labour market clearing implies that, in equilibrium, Hα is the
number of firms (expression (10)), that, in turn, is affected by a measure of economies of
scale, 11−σ . Also, expression
βσ
σ−1 is equivalent to the price of industrial goods consumed
locally (expression (12)). Therefore, it represents the industry’s market structure, the
production costs, and given that there are no profits in equilibrium, the prices. The rest of
the price index’s expression is relative to the percentage of industrial goods that needs to
be imported from the other region, which differentiates the price index between regions.
What makes the price index relevant in this model is the relationship between the
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agricultural and industrial sectors, making its goods substitutes or complements. Given
our setup, i.e., τ = 1.2, µ = 0.3, σ = 4, α = 1, β = 0.1, h = 1 and H = 100, the contrast of
prices are illustrated below:
P1 = 0.0287 < P2 = 0.0345 < pA1 = p
A
2 = 1
The main implications of these differences are straightforward: When goods become sub-
stitutes, agents will exchange a portion of income that was previously intended to agricul-
tural goods, to the consumption of a greater number of industrial ones. In the presence of
complementarity (as they are preferably consumed together) the higher price of agricul-
tural goods causes the share of expenditure for this type of goods to increase, in relation
to a Cobb-Douglas situation, where the percentage was independent of prices.
This largely explains the results of the simulations presented before. Recall, from
Section 4.1, that an increase in the elasticity of substitution (when h = 1), raises the share
of expenditure on industrial goods, which consequently increases the ratio of utilities in
favor of region 1, and finally, in favor of agglomeration. The percentage of industrial
goods in consumption grows as a result of a greater demand, whose price is significantly
lower.
Mindful of this aspect, it is important to analyze what would happen in the opposite
case, that is, when the price of the agricultural good is lower than the price of man-
ufactures. It is expected that an increase in the elasticity of substitution decreases the
percentage of expenditure on industrial products, since agents will choose to consume,
from the same amount of income, a higher volume of agricultural goods. Figure 12, to
this purpose, displays the share of expenditure on industrial goods in both regions over
ρ, when Pi > pA. In order to achieve a substantial difference, in the same way as in the
original setup, we increased β, the marginal cost of an industrial variety, to a value of 10,
but we could do the same for parameters α and H .
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Figure 12: Ratio of utilities over ρ + µ¯1 and µ¯2 over ρ, for h = 1 and β = 10
τ = 1.2, µ = 0.3, α = 1 and H = 100
The results are as expected. Positive values of the elasticity of substitution decrease
the share of expenditure on industrial goods, which is beneficial to workers of the pe-
ripheral region, as µ¯1 > µ¯2. Even in presence of transportation costs, that makes the
consumption of manufactured goods more expensive in relation to region 1, the ratio of
utilities suffers the same trend. Hence, in this scenario, an increase of ρ constitutes a
dispersion force.
The opposite case, when ρ is negative, the share of expenditure on industrial goods
increases less in the center. The utilities of both regions decreases, but the ratio increases
in favor of region 1 as they consume a larger share of agricultural goods.
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5 Economic interpretation
This dissertation would be incomplete if we did not extrapolate information allowing
us to understand the economic mechanisms behind the various changes in the ratio of
utilities discussed throughout the simulations. In this sense, we will first recall the known
centrifugal and centripetal forces, along with a reflection on the same under the new
conditions of this model.
The effects
Already introduced in the literature review of this work, it is important to reintroduce the
effects, from the point of view of the agents’ motivation, which drive the mechanism of
this model. On the basis of the new economic geography literature, the effects are divided
among forces that foster agglomeration and those that tend to disperse industry across
regions. First, the market size effect, in which firms intend to agglomerate in order to
constitute a larger market, each benefiting from a greater individual demand. This is a
example of the theory of circular causation of Myrdal (1957), where the increase of the
market (and demand) and the concentration of industry are cause and consequence of each
other. Second, in the same direction, there is the cost of living effect, a forward-linkage,
which results in a lower price index as more firms join in the region, being favorable
from the consumer point of view. Given a basket of goods, a greater variety of locally
available goods reduces the percentage that has to be imported, subject to transportation
costs. Finally, on the side of geographic dispersion, the market crowding effect. The
intense competition in an area of high concentration, which, as mentioned, lowers the
price index, causes a negative impact on industrial firms. Thus, firms see the shift to
the peripheral region as an opportunity to increase their demand, where they possess a
competitive advantage relatively to firms located at the center.
In Krugman’s model (1991), the agricultural sector was not that important in the spa-
tial distribution of the industry, since the share of expenditure on each sector was constant
and given ex-ante. Now, the elasticity of substitution, turning agricultural goods substi-
tutes or complements to industrial ones, causes the share of expenditure on each sector
to be endogenous, and therefore, the agriculture to be equally significant in the study of
equilibrium patterns. The abovementioned effects need, therefore, to be adapted to the
conditions in this model. So, what does the elasticity of substitution changes?
5.1 Elasticity of substitution
First, to clarify, when ρ→ 0, a Cobb-Douglas production function, the share of expen-
diture for the two goods is independent: when there are changes on industrial prices,
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for example, individuals only adjust their demand of this type of goods, not changing
their consumption of agricultural ones. Yet, as ρ increases, substitutability between the
agricultural and industrial goods enhances, being perfect substitutes at ρ = 1. Here, the
percentage of expenditure on industrial goods follows an inverse relationship to the price:
a rise in manufactured goods’ prices reduces the consumption of the same, as they can be
replaced with agricultural goods. On the other hand, as ρ reduces, the complementarity
increases, reaching perfect complements at ρ→ −∞, a Leontief production function. In
this case, the share of expenditure of industrial goods grows in relation to its price: in
order to consume the goods together, the agent chooses rather to reduce the percentage of
expenditure on agricultural goods.
So, recovering Figures 6 and 7, what is the economic interpretation of the increase of
the ratio of utilities with the elasticity of substitution, at h = 1, especially in the positive
range of ρ? We already know, from Section 4.1, that the increase in the elasticity of
substitution intensifies the share of expenditure on industrial goods in region 1. This
is caused by price differences, as seen in Section 4.4, which lead to the exchange of
agricultural goods for industrial ones.
This generates a greater demand for industrial goods, causing, obviously, an increase
on firm’s demand. Despite not increasing in terms of population or firms, the market-
size effect grows as consumers replace part of their consumption of agricultural goods for
industrial goods. Nevertheless, in terms of market crowding effect, for the same reasons,
the incentive for dispersion also enhances. As the market-size in the core region increases,
in the sense that the elasticity of substitution reveals a greater demand for industrial goods,
the same happens in the peripheral region. The following we know from the literature:
in the absence of local competition, a company has the temptation to deviate in order to
gain a competitive advantage and serve the peripheral population more accessible. Yet,
we also observed that this increase in demand is more felt in region 1, since ρ > 0, makes
µ¯1 > µ¯2. Therefore, as the increase of the demand, which is correlated with the market,
is larger in the core region, we can infer, for positive elasticities of substitution, that the
market-size exceeds the market-crowding effect.
A similar impact occurs, ceteris paribus, in the cost-of-living effect. On the one hand,
as we are examining the effects from a static point of view, given h = 1, changes on ρ
do not affect the market structure, the spatial distribution of industry and, from there, the
price indices. But, on the other hand, the substitution between agricultural and industrial
goods initiates a price competition between sectors, where the consumption of agricul-
tural goods is considerably more expensive. Hence, the substitution of a further part of
expenditure for industrial products (i.e. an increase in µ¯i) raises the amount of goods
that each consumer may acquire given its income, reducing their cost-of-living. Note
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that the differences in prices are so wide, that even the workers of the peripheral region,
which only produce the agricultural good, benefit from the substitution between sectors,
which increases their percentage of expenditure on industrial goods, µ¯2. However, due
to transportation costs, the region’s price index is higher, which makes, in comparison,
the improvement of living conditions more felt in the core region. Again, we can assert
that positive values of ρ favor agglomeration, since the cost-of-living effect improves pro-
portionally more for workers located in the core region. Therefore, for this setup, the net
result of the increase in the elasticity of substitution on these three forces works in support
of agglomeration, as the ratio of utilities improves in favor of the concentrated region.
A decrease in the elasticity of substitution for negative values makes agricultural and
industrial goods, in a certain level, become complements. As previously explained, since
the goods are preferably consumed together, the percentage of expenditure on industrial
(and agricultural) goods has a positive relationship with its price. Since agricultural goods
are more costly, the percentage of expenditure on industrial goods decreases with the
drop of ρ. As a consequence, the demand for industrial goods decreases, damaging the
market-size effect. Also, the decrease in µ¯1 is followed by a similar one in region 2,
that, by reducing the demand for industrial goods, relieves the incentive to deviate to the
other region, lowering the market-crowding effect. Meanwhile, the peripheral region has
a higher price index, which makes µ¯2 also bigger. In the end, the market crowding prevails
over the market size effect, because the decrease in demand for industrial goods is deeper
in the central region, which does not act in favor of an agglomeration pattern. Yet, the
effect of the elasticity of substitution on the cost-of-living is reserve of the one mentioned
above. Industrial goods’ prices, due to transportation costs, are always lower in the core
region, which translates the effect of ρ on cost-of-living always as an agglomeration force.
In this model, the prices are so significantly distinct, that even with transportation
costs, the largest consumption of industrial goods in the peripheral region allows an im-
provement of its consumers’ utility in relation to the core, acting on behalf of a dispersion
of skilled workers. Otherwise, if the cost-of-living effect exceeded the difference in de-
mand between the periphery and the core (the combined effect of market-crowding and
market-size effects), such as for ρ > 0, it is expected that negative values of the elasticity
of substitution would also be revealed as a force of agglomeration.
At this point, some conclusions can be made regarding the impact of the elasticity
of substitution in the effects behind the behavior of agents. From this first example, we
realized that the market-size and the market-crowding effects, for changes on preferences,
should be studied together, given that the share of expenditure on manufactured (and
agricultural) goods moves in the same direction for both regions. The differences between
µ¯1 and µ¯2, that change the industrial demands in different magnitudes, are focused on
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the respective price indices, which dates back to transportation costs that the peripheral
region has to bear. The same parameter also determines the differences in the cost-of-
living effect, however, contrary to the other effects, is has only one direction. Industrial
goods will always be comparatively more affordable in the core region, thus, any change
in the elasticity of substitution works as a centripetal force.
5.2 The price index
Section 4.4 highlighted the importance of price indices in the distribution of the industry,
explaining that the differences between the prices of agricultural and industrial goods was
the factor that triggered the above findings. On the contrary, when agricultural goods are
a cheaper alternative to industrial ones, the evidence shows us something quite different.
Starting from ρ > 0, the elasticity of substitution has the effect of decreasing the ratio
of utilities, discouraging agglomeration. This is because agents switch now part of their
consumption of industrial goods for agricultural ones, reducing the share of expenditure
on manufactured goods in both regions. Given the differences between price indices,
workers from the core region, would suffer more by consuming a higher percentage of
industrial goods. Indeed, in a somewhat paradoxical way, the fact that the market size ex-
ceeds the market-crowding effect, works opposed to the maintenance of an agglomeration
state, for the preference of skilled workers, not as firms, but as consumers, to move to the
other region in order to increase the consumption of agricultural goods. This is another
case where the high price differences overrule the final result.
Finally, when the goods are complements, the percentage of expenditure on industrial
goods increases more in the peripheral region. Thus, even if in the traditional definition of
market crowding effect the incentive for a deviation has increased (proportionally more
than the local market), workers in the center realize that this effect does not testify to-
wards a dispersion equilibrium, as they will spend, in addition to a higher price caused
by transportation costs, a greater percentage of income on industrial goods, which makes
their utility diminishing.
This analysis turns out to change even more the perception of the effects discussed
by the new economic geography literature. Skilled workers, with changes in preference
between agricultural and industrial goods, mix the professional with the consumer per-
spective. With agricultural goods comparatively more affordable, they go so far as to sac-
rifice the best decision from the firms’ point of view in order to reduce their cost of living.
That is, while better living conditions in the core region always translate as a force of ag-
glomeration, a higher proportional increase in market size in relation to market-crowding
effect, or in this case, a lower proportional decrease, that should have the same direction,
is reflected sometimes as a dispersion force, such is the preference for agricultural goods.
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6 Conclusions
The conclusions of this work should start for the reasons that make it unique. In this
model, the agricultural and industrial goods share a connection that did not previously
exist. At Cobb-Douglas, the share of expenditure on each type of goods was constant
and exogenous. Hence, the cost structure of manufacturing firms was not relevant to the
analysis of skilled workers’ spatial distribution. That being said, the effects of introducing
ρ, causing substitution or complementarity among agricultural and industrial goods, must
include a reflection of the price index, and more specifically, in the price competitiveness
between the two sectors of activity.
As an initial setup, much of the simulation conducted in this thesis was based on
the assumption that the price of industrial goods, essentially by assuming low marginal
costs, would be considerably lower than agricultural ones, selected as numéraire. Thus,
when goods become substitutes, the agents’ rationality would cause an exchange of con-
sumption of agricultural goods for industrial varieties. Otherwise, when the elasticity of
substitution is negative, the percentage of expenditure on industrial goods would decrease.
This happens because, in order to be consumed together, the higher relative price of agri-
cultural goods turns its percentage of expenditure also bigger, consequently, reducing the
demand for industrial goods.
Nevertheless, the impact of ρ on the share of expenditure on industrial goods is not
the same in the two regions, by the difference between price indices. On a core-periphery
state, the price index in the center is lower than the one recorded in the periphery, where
industrial goods are subject to transportation costs. When ρ is positive, the lower price
index causes the share of expenditure on industrial products to be greater in the core. On
the other hand, when the goods are complements, the percentage of expenditure on indus-
trial goods features a positive relation to the price index, which makes the consumption
of these goods by each individual larger in the periphery.
So, what conclusions can we draw from the elasticity of substitution in relation to
agglomeration and dispersion equilibria? Evidently, it depends on the set of selected
parameters, but at least we can classify, according to ρ (and prices), the effect as promoter
of concentration or dispersion of industry, i.e., in an additional centripetal or centrifugal
force.
When the elasticity of substitution is positive, as mentioned, the region in which all
the entrepreneurs are concentrated increases the percentage of expenditure on industrial
goods more than the periphery, which makes the center, in addition to being already the
region with the largest number of workers, the one which has a bigger demand for indus-
trial goods per consumer. In this case, the increase of the elasticity of substitution raises
the ratio of utilities in favor of region 1, given that the consumption of industrial goods
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grows both in absolute and relative terms more proportionately in the core than in the
periphery, which ultimately ends up acting in favor of agglomeration.
On the other hand, with negative values of the elasticity of substitution, a higher per-
centage of expenditure on industrial goods in the peripheral region increases a worker’s
utility in this region compared to the center. It is important to reiterate that this conclusion
is valid because the differences between the prices of agricultural and industrial goods are
so large that the higher price paid by industrial goods in the peripheral region does not
reach the effect of the differences between the share of industrial goods in consumption.
At the end, the peripheral region consumes a greater number of goods, encouraging there-
fore, the dispersion of skilled workers.
Afterwards, we studied the impact of ρ if the prices of agricultural goods were con-
siderably lower than the manufactured goods. When the elasticity of substitution is posi-
tive, consumers switch part of their consumption of industrial goods for agricultural ones,
reducing the percentage of expenditure on industrial goods in both regions. Given the
differences in price indices, workers from the core region suffer more by consuming a
higher share of expenditure on industrial goods, although having a better cost-of-living.
Finally, when the goods are complements, the share of expenditure on industrial goods
increases in the two regions, which decreases both the utilities, yet more in the periph-
eral region. Thus, with the price of agricultural goods more affordable, skilled workers
concentrated in the core, perceive that a greater demand in the peripheral region does not
testify in the direction of a possible deviation, as they will spend, in addition to trans-
portation costs, a greater percentage of their income on industrial goods.
It is interesting to analyze that, when agricultural goods are more competitive, the
market-size effect (the same being for the market-crowding effect) operates inversely to
the way that is studied in the literature. The higher the percentage of expenditure on
industrial products, the greater the size of the market. In the presence of a cheaper alter-
native good, in this case, the agricultural one, skilled workers, from a consumer position,
wish to move to the region where the demand of these type of goods is stronger, which is
the region with a lower demand for industrial goods.
Table 1 summarizes the impact of the elasticity of substitution, according to the pricing
structure of the two sectors, on the ratio of utilities in relation to the Cobb-Douglas case,
and hence, regarding the effect as a centripetal or centrifugal force.
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Table 1: Effects of ρ, according to prices
Pi is equal to the price index in region i = 1,2, whereas pA is the price of the agricultural good
A final thought for future research consists on the investigation of the model’s results
when the two sectors are equally competitive. By having studied the impact of ρ on
market-size, cost-of-living and market-crowding effects, we think that, when revealing
similar prices, any change in the elasticity of substitution, in relation to the Cobb-Douglas
benchmark, should raise the ratio of utilities in favor of the core, and thus, should act on
behalf of agglomeration. If this assumption is right, this could be explained by the cost-of-
living effect that, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements, tells us
that it is more pleasant to live in the center because the industrial goods are cheaper. So,
in a core-periphery economy, it may even exist a larger percentage of income intended
at the cheaper good in the peripheral region, which creates incentives to the deviation
of skilled workers. However, we suppose that this latter effect would not be offset by the
differences of living conditions between the periphery and the center, revealing the crucial
role of iceberg costs, one of the pillars of the new economic geography literature.
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Appendix A
Derivation of expression (3):
Given the CES utility function (1), let us maximize with respect to xi, subject to
Pixi + PAai = y, (PA = 1) (8). So, replacing ai = y − xiPi in the function, we obtain an
unconstrained maximization of Ui = µx
ρ
i + (1− µ)(y − xiPi)ρ. The first order condition
results in the following steps:
dUi
dxi
= 0⇔
⇔µx ρ−1i + (1− µ)(y−Pixi)ρ−1(−Pi) = 0⇔
⇔µ 1ρ−1 xi = (1− µ)
1
ρ−1 P
1
ρ−1
i (y−Pixi)⇔
⇔xi (µ
1
ρ−1 +P
ρ
ρ−1
i (1− µ)
1
ρ−1 ) = (1− µ) 1ρ−1 P
1
ρ−1
i y⇔
⇔xi =
(1− µ) 1ρ−1 P
1
ρ−1
i
µ
1
ρ−1 +P
ρ
ρ−1
i (1− µ)
1
ρ−1
y⇔
⇔Pixi =
(1− µ) 1ρ−1 P
ρ
ρ−1
i
µ
1
ρ−1 +P
ρ
ρ−1
i (1− µ)
1
ρ−1
y⇔
⇔Pixi = (1− µ)
1
ρ−1
µ
1
ρ−1 P
− ρρ−1
i + (1− µ)
1
ρ−1
y⇔
⇔Pixi = 1
1+ ( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
y,
Given this equation, µ¯i = 1
1+( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
, is the share of expenditure in manufactured
goods.
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Appendix B
Derivation of expression (19):
PluggingYi =wiHi+ L2 into wi =
1
σ
[
µ¯iYi
Hi+φH j
+
φµ¯ jYj
φHi+H j
]
, generates a system of two linear
equations in wi and w j :

wi =
1
σ
[
µ¯i ( L2 +wiHi )
Hi+φH j
+
φµ¯ j ( L2 +w jH j )
φHi+H j
]
w j =
1
σ
[
µ¯ j ( L2 +w jH j )
φHi+H j
+
φµ¯i ( L2 +wiHi )
Hi+φH j
] ,
that can be solved to obtain the equilibrium skilled wages as explicit functions of the
spatial distribution of skilled workers, Hi. We solve the system through Cramer’s rule.

aiiwi + ai jw j = bi
a jiwi + a j jw j = b j
,
where aii = 1− 1σ µ¯iHiHi+φH j , ai j =− 1σ
φµ¯ jH j
φHi+H j
, a ji =− 1σ φµ¯iHiHi+H j , a j j = 1− 1σ
µ¯ jH j
φHi+H j
, bi = 1σ
L
2 (
µ¯i
Hi+φH j
+
φµ¯ j
φHi+H j
) and b j = 1σ
L
2 (
φµ¯i
Hi+φH j
+
µ¯ j
φHi+H j
).
4i = bia j j − b jai j
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1
σ
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2
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+
φµ¯ j
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) (
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σ
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)
−
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σ
(
φµ¯iH2i + µ¯iHiH j + µ¯ jH jHi +φµ¯ jH
2
j
)
+
(
1
σ
)2 (
(1−φ2) µ¯iHi µ¯ jH j
)
=
1
(Hi +φH j )(φHi +H j )
[
(H2i +H
2
j )φ− ( µ¯iH2i + µ¯ jH2j )
φ
σ
+
+ HiH j *,φ2+1− 1σ ( µ¯i + µ¯ j )+
(
1
σ
)2
−
(
1
σ
)2
φ2 µ¯i µ¯ j+-

=
1
(Hi +φH j )(φHi +H j )
[
(H2i +H
2
j )φ− ( µ¯iH2i + µ¯ jH2j )
φ
σ
+
+ HiH j *,1+
(
1
σ
)2
− µ¯i + µ¯ j
σ
+φ2
(
1− µ¯i µ¯ j
σ2
)+-

Therefore:
wi =
4i
4 =
1
σ
L
2
φHi ( µ¯i + µ¯ j )+
[
µ¯i − µ¯i µ¯ jσ + (1+ µ¯iσ ) µ¯ jφ2
]
H j
φ(H2i +H
2
j )− (H2i µ¯i +H2j µ¯ j ) φσ +
[
1+ 1
σ2
− µ¯i+µ¯ jσ + (1−
µ¯i µ¯ j
σ2
)φ2
]
HiH j
By symmetry, we can simply obtain 4 j to get w j :
w j =
4 j
4 =
1
σ
L
2
φH j ( µ¯i + µ¯ j )+
[
µ¯ j − µ¯i µ¯ jσ + (1+
µ¯ j
σ ) µ¯iφ
2
]
Hi
φ(H2i +H
2
j )− (H2i µ¯i +H2j µ¯ j ) φσ +
[
1+ 1
σ2
− µ¯i+µ¯ jσ + (1−
µ¯i µ¯ j
σ2
)φ2
]
HiH j
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Appendix C
Derivation of expression (21):
Returning expression (2), replacing y by wi:
Pixi =
1
1+ ( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
wi,
that is equivalent to:
xi =
1
Pi +
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ P
1
1−ρ
i
wi
Back to the utility function (1), subject to Pixi + Ai = wi:
V ∗i = µx
ρ
i + (1− µ)(wi −Pixi)ρ
=
[
µ
1
ρ + (1− µ) 1ρ (wixi −Pi)
]
xi
=
µ
1
ρ +(1−µ) 1ρ
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ P
1
1−ρ
i
Pi+
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ P
1
1−ρ
i
wi
=
µ
1
ρ
1+ 1−µµ
( 1−µ
µ
) ρ
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i

1
ρ
Pi
1+
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i

wi
=
µ
1
ρ
Pi
[
1+
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
] 1−ρ
ρ
wi
=
µ
1
ρ
Pi
[
1
µ¯i
] 1−ρ
ρ wi
V ∗i =
µ
1
ρ
µ¯
1−ρ
ρ
i
(
wi
Pi
)
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Appendix D
Derivation of expression (24):
Expression (24) was the last step possible of an attempt to simplify V1V2 > 1 (h = 1),
a necessary condition for the existence of a agglomeration equilibrium in region 1. Our
aim was to prepare a simple condition that would explain the model’s dynamics analyt-
ically for agglomeration patterns. Thus, returning expression (23), and applying some
mathematical manipulation:
φ
1
1−σ
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ φ( µ¯1+µ¯2)
µ¯2− µ¯1 µ¯2σ +(1+
µ¯2
σ ) µ¯1φ
2
> 1
φ
2−σ
1−σ
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ
1+ µ¯2µ¯1
µ¯2
µ¯1
− µ¯2σ +(1+
µ¯2
σ )φ
2
> 1
φ
2−σ
1−σ
(
µ¯2
µ¯1
) 1−ρ
ρ
1+ µ¯2µ¯1
µ¯2
µ¯1
+φ2−(1−φ2) µ¯2σ
> 1
Let us now displace µ¯i, not using the entire formula µ¯i = 1
1+( 1−µµ )
1
1−ρ P
ρ
1−ρ
i
, but rather
simplifying things up, writing the expression in a way that reflects the difference between
the two regions, expressed in their price indices. Hereupon, at h = 1, as the price in-
dices are P1 =
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ and P2 =
βσ
σ−1
(Hφ
α
) 1
1−σ , we obtain P2P1 = φ
1
1−σ . We cannot simply
eliminate the remainder of the price index expression on µ¯2µ¯1 , due to the sum in the denom-
inator of µ¯i. With that in mind, the best way to simplify
µ¯2
µ¯1
is to rearrange as 1+θ1+φ∗θ , with
θ =
( 1−µ
µ
) 1
1−ρ
(
βσ
σ−1
(
H
α
) 1
1−σ
) ρ
1−ρ
and φ∗ = φ
ρ
(1−σ)(1−ρ) , the distinctive fraction of the share of
expenditure in manufactured goods between regions:
φ
2−σ
1−σ
(
1+ θ
1+φ∗θ
) 1−ρ
ρ 1+ 1+θ1+φ∗θ
1+θ
1+φ∗θ +φ
2− (1−φ2) 1(1+φ∗θ)σ
> 1
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